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1 
ARTICLES 
TWO TOO MANY:  
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES OF 
WARRANTIES UNDER THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE 
JENNIFER CAMERO† 
INTRODUCTION 
Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., traditionally known for its safe and 
reliable vehicles, recently shocked the world with multiple 
voluntary recalls, affecting an astonishing number of vehicles.  In 
November 2009, Toyota recalled 3.8 million vehicles due to 
unintended acceleration1 and, only a few months later, recalled 
an additional 2.3 million vehicles, also due to unintended 
acceleration.2  Not even one year after the first recall, Toyota 
issued yet another recall of approximately 740,000 vehicles, this 
time due to leaking brake fluid.3 
 
† J.D., Northwestern University School of Law. Member of the Illinois State Bar 
and Certified Public Accountant in Illinois. Teaching Fellow and Assistant Professor 
of Professional Practice at Louisiana State University Law Center. The author 
would like to thank the law faculty at Louisiana State University, especially Melissa 
Lonegrass, Scott Sullivan, Ken Levy, Christina Sautter and Bill Corbett, for their 
insightful comments. The author also would like to thank Mark Camero for his 
patience and support as well as his constructive criticism on the many drafts of this 
article. 
1 Marc Stern, Toyota Recall: Toyota Broadens Recall to 3.8 Million Cars,  
Trucks; To Fix Gas Pedal, Rugs, CAR NEWS BREAK (Nov. 25, 2009), http://www. 
carnewsbreak.com/news/1039027_toyota-recall-toyota-broadens-recall-to-3-8-million-
cars-trucks-to-fix-gas-pedal-rugs. 
2 See Press Release, Toyota Motor Sales, Toyota Files Voluntary Safety Recall 
on Select Toyota Division Vehicles for Sticking Accelerator Pedal (Jan. 21, 2010), 
available at http://pressroom.toyota.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=1844. 
3 Press Release, Toyota Motor Sales, Toyota Announces Intent To Voluntarily 
Recall Certain Toyota Avalon and Highlander, and Lexus GS300, IS250, and IS350 
Vehicles To Replace a Brake Master Cylinder Seal (Oct. 20, 2010), available  
at http://pressroom.toyota.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=2113; Nicole Wilson, 
Toyota Recall October 2010–Potential Brake Fluid Leak Involves 740,000 Vehicles, 
BEST SYNDICATION (Oct. 21, 2010, 1:13 PM), http://www.bestsyndication.com/ 
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Given the significant number of affected vehicles, Toyota 
should expect to see numerous injuries and damages caused by 
such defects.  In one case, a California Highway Patrol Officer 
was driving a Lexus, Toyota’s luxury brand, with three 
passengers when the car began accelerating automatically.4  The 
vehicle reached a speed of 120 miles per hour and then collided 
into another vehicle, killing all four passengers in the Lexus and 
severely damaging the other vehicle.5 
Although the family of the deceased officer sued Toyota for 
negligence,6 the family also could have sued under other product 
liability theories, specifically breach of warranty, as the car was 
not fit for its ordinary purpose.7  In fact, thus far, most other 
suits filed against Toyota relating to the recalls allege both 
negligence and breach of warranty.8  Ultimately, the legal claims 
were irrelevant to the family of the officer because Toyota quickly 
settled the matter for ten million dollars.9  But what about the 
owner of the other vehicle involved in the collision?  Does he have 
 
?q=20101021_toyota_recall_october_2010_vehicle_model_year_list_announced_brake
_repair_needed.htm;  
4 See Stern, supra note 1. 
5 See id. 
6 See Complaint for Damages at 6–7, Saylor v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 37-2010-
00086718-CU-PL-CTL, 2010 WL 732013 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 2010). 
7 Product liability is a blend of contract law and tort law concepts. See Jay M. 
Feinman, Implied Warranty, Products Liability, and the Boundary Between Contract 
and Tort, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 469, 477 (1997). In fact, product liability encompasses 
four different causes of actions: (i) negligence; (ii) strict liability; (iii) breach of 
contract; and (iv) breach of implied warranty. See Alex Devience, Jr., The Developing 
Line Between Warranty and Tort Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code: 
Does 2-318 Make a Difference?, 2 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 295, 295–96 (1990). Often, a 
plaintiff will sue on all four actions with the hope of recovering under at least one. 
8 See, e.g., Amended Economic Loss Master Consolidated Complaint at 219–26, 
In re Toyota Motor Corp., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 8:10ML2151 
JVS), 2010 WL 4257075 (claiming breach of express warranty and breach of implied 
warranty of merchantability); Complaint at 10–12, Welch v. Toyota Motor Sales, 
U.S.A., Inc., No. 010CV04276, 2010 WL 4222883 (D. Minn. Oct. 19, 2010) (claiming 
negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty); Complaint for Damages at 39–
44, Hatzman v. Toyota Motor N. Am., Inc., No. 10CV06282, 2010 WL 3779523 (C.D. 
Cal. Aug. 23, 2010) (claiming negligence, strict products liability, and breach of 
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose); 
Complaint for Damages 30–33, Lebson v. Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc., No. 
10CV6081, 2010 WL 3299128 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2010) (claiming strict product 
liability, breach of express and implied warranty, and negligence). 
9 See Martha Neil, Judge Nixes Secrecy Pact in High-Profile Fatal Toyota Crash 
Settlement; Automaker Paid $10M, AM. BAR ASS’N JOURNAL (Dec. 23, 2010,  
5:37 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/ipad/article/judge_nixes_secrecy_pact_in_high-
profile_toyota_crash_settlement_automaker_/. 
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the ability to sue Toyota for breach of warranty to recover the 
cost of the damage caused to his vehicle by the allegedly defective 
Lexus? 
Historically, the answer to the preceding question was a 
resounding no.  Common law traditionally required a contractual 
relationship between Toyota and the injured parties, allowing 
only the purchaser of the vehicle to sue a manufacturer for 
breach of warranty.10  In the 1950s, due to a gradual shift in 
public policy aimed at protecting consumers, section 2-318 was 
added to the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) to allow certain 
third parties to sue a manufacturer or other seller—such as a 
distributor or retailer—for breach of warranty despite the 
absence of a contractual relationship.11 
Unlike the majority of the UCC, which provides one 
provision per section, the drafters of section 2-318 offer three 
alternatives from which states’ legislatures can choose to enact.12  
The alternatives cover a wide spectrum of third parties excluded 
from the privity requirement in breach of warranty suits.  At one 
end of the spectrum, only the purchaser’s family members with 
personal injury can maintain a breach of warranty claim.  At the 
other end, any reasonably foreseeable party with any reasonable 
damage can sue a manufacturer or other seller for breach of 
warranty.13 
Not only do the three alternatives produce vastly different 
outcomes from each other, but the common law among the states 
that adopted the same alternative also vastly differs.  These 
variations result in the same fact pattern often leading to 
different outcomes, depending on the applicable alternative and 
how the case law developed in that jurisdiction. The end result is 
a provision that not only defeats the UCC’s fundamental  
 
 
10 1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & LINDA J. RUSCH, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
SERIES § 2-318:1 (Frederick H. Miller ed., 2010); R. D. Hursh, Annotation, Privity of 
Contract as Essential to Recovery in Action Based on Theory Other than Negligence, 
Against Manufacturer or Seller of Product Alleged To Have Caused Injury, 75 
A.L.R.2d 39, § 3 (1961) (citing Collum v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 288 P.2d 75 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1955); Tralli v. Triple X Stores, Inc., 112 A.2d 507, 509 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
1954); Howson v. Foster Beef Co., 177 A. 656, 659 (N.H. 1935)). 
11 1 HAWKLAND & RUSCH, supra note 10. 
12 William L. Stallworth, An Analysis of Warranty Claims Instituted by Non-
Privity Plaintiffs in Jurisdictions that Have Adopted Uniform Commercial Code 
Section 2-318 (Alternative A), 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1215, 1229 (1993). 
13 U.C.C. § 2-318 (2010). 
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purposes of simplicity and uniformity, but also creates 
unpredictable seller liability and generates unnecessary battles 
over applicable state law. 
This Article surveys and analyzes the current version of 
section 2-318 and suggests improvements so that section 2-318 
produces more uniform and equitable results that better 
facilitate interstate commerce in today’s complex commercial 
environment.  Part I discusses the historical genesis of section 2-
318, specifically the common law concept of privity and its 
progression to the current version of section 2-318.  Part II 
expounds upon certain issues with section 2-318 as currently 
drafted, which include lack of uniformity and lack of remedy for a 
valid breach of warranty claim.  Part III establishes how the 
courts have begun eroding the concept of privity in spite of  
the language of section 2-318, thus eliminating the need for 
alternatives.  Part IV proposes improvements to section 2-318  
in accordance with current case law and public policy aimed  
at protecting consumers.  Finally, Part V demonstrates that  
the states would adopt the proposed provision given today’s 
consumer-centric society. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF UCC SECTION 2-318  
Privity is the legal relationship between the parties to a 
contract or transaction.14  Historically, a plaintiff needed to be in 
privity with the defendant in order to maintain a cause of 
action.15  The 1842 English case of Winterbottom v. Wright is the 
first case to decide that lack of privity is a defense to a claim.16  
In Winterbottom, the Postmaster General had purchased mail 
coaches from one company, but then hired drivers for the coaches 
from another company.  One such driver sued the supplier of the 
coaches for breach of contract for injuries caused by the tipping of 
the coach.17  The court barred the claim because the driver was 
not a party to the contract between the Postmaster General and 
the supplier of the coach, reasoning that “[u]nless we confine the  
 
 
 
14 Hartley v. Phillips, 47 A. 929, 935 (Pa. 1901). 
15 Id.  
16 Stallworth, supra note 12, at 1225. 
17 See Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. Ct.). 
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operation of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into 
them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I 
can see no limit, would ensue.”18 
After Winterbottom, American courts began to adopt the 
concept of privity, applying it to both tort law and contract law 
claims.19  Over time, courts slowly eroded the need for privity 
with respect to common law tort claims,20 leaving privity 
applicable only to contract law claims.  Courts eventually began 
to recognize the need for exceptions to privity in the context of 
contract law claims in order to protect consumers from certain 
products.  Initially, courts removed the need for privity in claims 
involving food and beverage, placing the public welfare above the 
legal necessity for privity.21  Soon after, courts removed the need 
for privity in claims involving inherently dangerous products 
under a similar public policy rationale.22  A few progressive 
 
18 Id. at 406; William Prosser, noted torts scholar, suggested that the rationale 
for privity was to support the Industrial Revolution since less manufacturer liability 
encourages industry to further advance product technology. Steven Bonanno, 
Privity, Products Liability, and UCC Warranties: A Retrospect of and Prospects for 
Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 177, 178–79 (1991). 
19 1 HAWKLAND & RUSCH, supra note 10. 
20 Id. The end of privity in tort cases culminated with Justice Cardozo’s famed 
opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). In 
MacPherson, Buick sold an automobile to a dealer, who in turn sold it to Mr. 
MacPherson. Id. at 384. While driving the automobile, the car suddenly collapsed, 
throwing Mr. MacPherson from the car. Id. at 384–85. In ruling for MacPherson, 
Judge Cardozo stated that of “there is added knowledge that the thing will be used 
by persons other than the purchaser . . . irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of 
this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully.” Id. at 389. In this case, 
Buick sold it to a dealer, so Buick knew it would be sold to an end user. Id. at 391. 
Also, the car sat three people and not just one, indicating Buick was well aware that 
more than one person could be in the vehicle at any time. Id. 
21 See, e.g., Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 47 N.E.2d 739, 745 (Ill. App. Ct. 1943) 
(citing Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 176 N.W. 382, 392 (Iowa 1920); Boyd v. Coca 
Cola Bottling Works, 177 S.W. 80, 81 (Tenn. 1915)); Davis, 176 N.W. at 392 (“We are 
of [the] opinion that the duty of a manufacturer to see to it that food products put 
out by him are wholesome, and the implied warranty that such products are fit for 
use runs with the sale, and to the public, for the benefit of the consumer, rather than 
to the wholesaler or retailer, and that the question of privity of contract in sales is 
not controlling, and does not apply in such a case.”); Boyd, 177 S.W. at 81 (“Upon 
whatever ground the liability of such a manufacturer to the ultimate consumer is 
placed, the result is eminently satisfactory, conducive to the public welfare, and one 
which we approve.”); La Hue v. Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc., 314 P.2d 421, 422 (Wash. 
1957) (explaining that liability of manufacturers for breach of warranties related to 
food and beverage is the exception to the general rule of privity). 
22 See, e.g., Lichina v. Futura Inc., 260 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D. Colo. 1966) (“[T]his 
Court recognize[s] the rapidly-expanding notion that privity of contract should not 
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courts took the exceptions one step further and even allowed a 
non-purchaser to maintain a cause of action where the individual 
was injured, regardless of the nature of the product; however, at 
that time, extending the exceptions to privity this far was 
unusual.23  Ultimately, despite some relaxation by courts of the 
requirement of privity for contract law claims, the majority of 
courts still grasped onto the historical concept of privity:  Only 
the purchaser of the product has privity and is therefore the only 
party able to sue a manufacturer or other seller for breach of 
warranty.24 
The first codification of exceptions to the privity requirement 
for warranty claims appeared in section 43 of the Uniform 
Revised Sales Act,25 which extended warranty protection to 
anyone that was reasonably expected to use or be affected by the 
 
be a condition of recovery on a breach of warranty theory, at least where the product 
causing the injury creates a high degree of hazard to third persons.”); Chapman v. 
Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 118 (D. Haw. 1961), aff’d, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962) 
(“This court can see no rational basis for distinguishing between a public policy 
which favors protection of consumers of unwholesome and dangerous food and one 
which favors protection of a consumer injured by dangerously flammable clothing.”); 
Brewer v. Oriard Powder Co., 401 P.2d 844, 848 (Wash. 1965) (“[A] manufacturer of 
dynamite is liable to the ultimate user for breach of implied warranty of fitness 
without regard to privity of contract.”). 
23 See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 99–100 (N.J. 
1960) (allowing the injured wife of the purchaser of a vehicle to sue the 
manufacturer for breach of warranty despite no privity of contract). 
24 In one example, a mother purchased a washing machine from Sears. Dewar v. 
Sears Roebuck & Co., 49 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 1944). Exposed 
moving parts of the washing machine severely injured her infant son. Id. The son 
sued Sears on a breach of warranty claim for his injuries, alleging that the 
employees of Sears represented that the washing machine had no defective parts 
and no unguarded moving parts. Id. He also sued Sears on a negligence claim, 
asserting that Sears negligently represented that the machine did not have any 
exposed moving parts. Id. The court dismissed the breach of warranty claim for lack 
of privity of contract with Sears because the son did not purchase the washing 
machine. Id. at 656. Sears’s only duty was to the purchaser of the washing machine, 
the mother. See id. The court also dismissed the negligence claim for insufficiency, 
leaving the injured infant without a cause of action against Sears. Id. at 656–57. The 
court dismissed the negligence claim for insufficiency because the complaint failed to 
allege that Sears owed a duty of care to the infant. Id. at 657. 
25 The Uniform Sales Act was drafted in 1906 and adopted by thirty-four states 
over the thirty-five years following its adoption. Richard E. Speidel, Introduction to 
Symposium on Proposed Revised Article 2, 54 SMU L. REV. 787, 787 (2001). After a 
failed attempt to federalize sales law, a Uniform Revised Sales Act was proposed to 
quiet critics of the Uniform Sales Act. See id. at 787–88. 
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product.26  The drafters of section 43 desired not only to diminish 
the severe results that would occur due to the privity 
requirement but also to reflect the judicial erosion of the common 
law privity requirements.27 
In the 1950s, Article 2 of the UCC replaced the proposed 
Uniform Revised Sales Act in order to modernize and streamline 
commercial law.28  The original version of section 2-318, which 
replaced section 43, was more limited than section 43 with 
respect to third-party exclusions from the privity requirement.29  
Unlike the section it replaced, section 2-318 only extended 
warranty protection to an individual with personal injury who 
was in the family or household of the initial purchaser so long as 
it was reasonable to expect that the individual would use, 
consume, or be affected by the product.30  Many states, however, 
chose not to adopt this provision because they disagreed on the 
amount of liability that should rest with a manufacturer or other 
seller for a breach of warranty claim by a non-purchaser.31  The 
California legislature, for example, refused to adopt section 2-
318, believing that it was “a step backward” from section 43.32   
 
 
 
26 1 HAWKLAND & RUSCH, supra note 10. Section 43 stated: “A warranty extends 
to any natural person whose relationship to the buyer is such as to make it 
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods 
and who is injured in person or property by breach of the warranty.” Id. 
27 Id. (describing section 43 as reflecting hostility “to the concept of privity as a 
limitation on warranty relief” and “a sympathy for consumers and a feeling that the 
cost of product liability should be spread among all users of the product in the form 
of higher prices”); cf. Publisher’s Editorial Staff, Privity of Contract in UCC 
Warranty Cases, THE LAWYER’S BRIEF, Dec. 15, 2008, at 1 (underscoring the UCC 
drafters’ desire to create exceptions to the privity defense). 
28 Imad D. Abyad, Note, Commercial Reasonableness in Karl Llewellyn’s 
Uniform Commercial Code Jurisprudence, 83 VA. L. REV. 429, 436 (1997) (“The 
codification of commercial law sprung out of dissatisfaction with the uniform 
statutes of the previous fifty years.”); Arthur Linton Corbin, The Uniform 
Commercial Code—Sales; Should It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821, 834–35 (1950) 
(“But after the 50 years through which we have just lived, the old rules need some 
replacement, the old words need changing, the analysis and organization can be 
improved, the remedies can be made more effective.”). 
29 1 HAWKLAND & RUSCH, supra note 10. 
30 U.C.C. § 2-318 (2010). 
31 Arlie R. Nogay, Comment, Enforcing the Rights of Remote Sellers Under the 
UCC: Warranty Disclaimers, the Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular 
Purpose and the Notice Requirement in the Nonprivity Context, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 
873, 884 (1986). 
32 1 HAWKLAND & RUSCH, supra note10, at § 2-318. 
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Overall, the success of the original section 2-318 is questionable, 
as ten states chose not to adopt it and many other states had 
proposals for amendments.33 
As a result of this schism, the drafters of the UCC added two 
alternatives to the section in 196634 “to allow the individual 
states . . . to reflect the philosophies in the treatment of 
‘warranty’ protections which may be thought ‘proper.’ ”35  The 
drafters reasoned that providing a limited number of options to 
the states could limit the number of variations among the 
states.36 
Section 2-318 has not changed much since the revision in 
1966.  The current version of section 2-318 retains the three 
alternatives, with Alternative A37 being the 1962 version and 
Alternatives B and C being the alternatives that the drafters 
added in 1966.38  At first glance, the language of each alternative 
 
33 Id. 
34 Lukwinski v. Stone Container Corp., 726 N.E.2d 665, 670 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). 
35 McNally v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 313 A.2d 913, 921 (Me. 1973). 
36 John L. Amabile & John C. Amabile, Warranties, in AM. BAR ASS’N, BUSINESS 
AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 101:57 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d 
ed. 2011). 
37 For a detailed discussion on Alternative A, see Stallworth, supra note 12, at 
1229–30. 
38  Alternative A to subsection (2). A seller’s warranty to an immediate 
buyer, whether express or implied, a seller’s remedial promise to an 
immediate buyer, or a seller’s obligation to a remote purchaser under 
Section 2-313A or 2-313B extends to any individual who is in the family or 
household of the immediate buyer or the remote purchaser or who is a guest 
in the home of either if it is reasonable to expect that the person may use, 
consume, or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach 
of the warranty, remedial promise, or obligation. A seller may not exclude 
or limit the operation of this section. 
Alternative B to subsection (2). A seller’s warranty to an immediate 
buyer, whether express or implied, a seller’s remedial promise to an 
immediate buyer, or a seller’s obligation to a remote purchaser under 
Section 2-313A or 2-313B extends to any individual who may reasonably be 
expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is injured in 
person by breach of the warranty, remedial promise, or obligation. A seller 
may not exclude or limit the operation of this section. 
Alternative C to subsection (2). A seller’s warranty to an immediate 
buyer, whether express or implied, a seller’s remedial promise to an 
immediate buyer, or a seller’s obligation to a remote purchaser under 
Section 2-313A or 2-313B extends to any person that may reasonably be 
expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and that is injured by 
breach of the warranty, remedial promise, or obligation. A seller may not 
exclude or limit the operation of this section with respect to injury to the 
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appears similar, but the results of each alternative are not.  Who 
is excluded from the privity requirement and what type of 
damages that party can seek from a manufacturer or other seller 
vary dramatically among the three alternatives, as demonstrated 
by the following chart. 
 
Alternative Parties Excepted 
from the Privity 
Requirement
Damages 
Recoverable 
A Family member, 
household member or 
guest in the home of 
the original purchaser
Personal Injury 
B Anyone reasonably 
expected to use, 
consume or be affected 
by the product
Personal Injury 
C Anyone reasonably 
expected to use, 
consume or be affected 
by the product
Personal Injury or 
Property Damage 
 
Comparing the three alternatives, Alternative A is the most 
limited in terms of who is excluded from the privity requirement 
for a breach of warranty claim.  Specifically, it only exempts 
individuals who are household or family members of the 
purchaser or who are household guests.39  Alternative A is also 
the most limited in terms of what damages a plaintiff can seek 
for breach of warranty because it requires that a plaintiff suffer 
personal injury.40  Alternative B expands coverage of Alternative 
 
person of an individual to whom the warranty, remedial promise, or 
obligation extends. 
U.C.C. § 2-318 (2010) (emphasis added). 
39 Id. 
40 In one example of Alternative A, an individual in Illinois purchased a Toyota 
from a dealer. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Toyota Motor Mfg. N. Am., Inc., No. 09 C 1517, 
2009 WL 3147315, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2009). The car ignited while parked in 
the garage with the engine off, demolishing itself and another car and causing 
$600,000 in damages to the individual’s residence. Id. The individual had 
homeowner’s insurance with Allstate, which reimbursed him for the loss and then 
sued Toyota for breach of warranty. Id. The court dismissed the case because 
Allstate did not meet the requirements of Alternative A—adopted by Illinois—as 
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A to include any party reasonably expected to use, consume, or be 
affected by the good.41  While Alternative B expands the class of 
people who can sue for breach of warranty beyond the narrow 
category recognized in Alternative A, it retains Alternative A’s 
requirement of personal injury.42  Alternative C maintains 
Alternative B’s plaintiff pool, but it expands the types of damages 
recoverable for breach of warranty to all damages, including 
property and economic damage.43  The policy behind providing 
such a broad exception to the privity requirement is to prohibit 
manufacturers from binding consumers to contracts to which 
they are not parties.44 
Unexpectedly,45 the distribution of the alternatives among 
the states is uneven—with a majority of states adopting 
Alternative A,46 six states adopting Alternative B,47 and eight 
states adopting Alternative C.48  Even with three alternatives 
 
Allstate was not a family member and did not seek damages for personal injury. Id. 
at *2. 
41 U.C.C. § 2-318. 
42 In one example of Alternative B, a machine crushed the foot of a man while at 
work, so he sued the manufacturer of the machine for breach of warranty. Cereo v. 
Takigawa Kogyo Co., Ltd., 252 A.D.2d 963, 963, 676 N.Y.S.2d 364, 365 (4th Dep’t 
1998). The court allowed the claim under New York law—Alternative B—as 
employees are specifically part of the plaintiff class covered by Alternative B, and 
the employee had a personal injury. Id. at 964, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 365. 
43 In one case, an aerial photography business sued the maker of a 
remanufactured aircraft engine for breach of warranty. Horizons, Inc. v. Avco Corp., 
551 F. Supp. 771, 774 (D.S.D. 1982), rev’d on other grounds, 714 F.2d 862 (8th Cir. 
1983). The plaintiff sought only economic losses, including labor costs to 
troubleshoot and repair the engine, costs to purchase and install a replacement 
engine, and lost profits. Id. at 775–76. The manufacturer sought dismissal of the 
claim for lack of privity because the plaintiff purchased the engine through a 
distributor. Id. at 777. The court refused to dismiss the claim on the grounds that 
the plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable user, and the language of the statute 
specifically allows purely economic losses. Id. at 778. 
44 GKW Elecs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., No. 91-15791, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 
16238, at *5–6 (9th Cir. July 8, 1992). 
45 If the states were truly divided over the appropriate exceptions to privity, the 
number of states adopting each alternative should be more evenly divided. 
46 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Shawn M. 
Bates & Deborah J. Karakowsky, U.C.C. Section 2-318: The ABCs of Defense, COM. 
& BUS. LITIG., Summer 2009, at 1, 17. 
47 Alabama, Delaware, Kansas, New York, South Carolina, and Vermont. Id. 
48 Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and 
Wyoming. Id. 
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from which to choose, eight states decided not to enact any of the 
three alternatives.49  Out of those eight states, California, 
Louisiana, and Texas chose not to adopt any statute regarding 
privity.50  The remaining five states—Maine, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Virginia—adopted similar 
provisions.51  Like Alternative C, these states allow a party to sue 
despite no privity of contract as long as the plaintiff was a person 
who may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected 
by the goods, regardless of whether the damages were personal 
injury or economic loss.52  The laws in these states differ from 
Alternative C in that their statutes explicitly allow a purchaser 
to sue any seller in the distribution chain whereas Alternative C 
remains silent on that issue.53  Because courts in almost every 
state have developed the common law to permit the purchaser to 
 
49 California, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, 
Texas, and Virginia. Id. Louisiana has adopted every article of the UCC except 
Articles 2 and 2A of the UCC. Henry D. Gabriel, The Revisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code—Process and Politics, 19 J.L. & COM. 125, 125 n.1 (1999); Robert 
E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009, 1032 n.76 (2002). 
50 CAL. COM. CODE § 2318 (West 2011); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.318 
(West 2011). 
51 Bates & Karakowsky, supra note 46. 
52 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-318 (2011) (“Lack of privity between plaintiff 
and defendant shall be no defense in any action brought against the manufacturer, 
seller or supplier of goods [to recover damages] for breach of warranty . . . if the 
plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer, seller or supplier might reasonably 
have expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 106, § 2-318 (West 2011) (“Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall 
be no defense in any action brought against the manufacturer, seller, lessor or 
supplier of goods to recover damages for breach of warranty . . . if the plaintiff was a 
person whom the manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier might reasonably have 
expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-
A:2-318 (2011) (“Lack of privity shall not be a defense in any action brought against 
the manufacturer, seller or supplier of goods to recover damages for breach of 
warranty . . . if the plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer, seller or supplier 
might reasonably have expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods.”); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6A-2-318 (West 2010) (“A seller’s or a manufacturer’s or a 
packer’s warranty . . . extends to any person who may reasonably be expected to use, 
consume, or be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the warranty.”); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (West 2011) (“Lack of privity between plaintiff and 
defendant shall be no defense in any action brought against the manufacturer or 
seller of goods to recover damages for breach of warranty . . . if the plaintiff was a 
person whom the manufacturer or seller might reasonably have expected to use, 
consume, or be affected by the goods . . . .”). 
53 E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-318 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6A-2-
318 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (West 2011). 
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sue any party in the distribution chain,54 a breach of warranty 
claim by a third party litigated in these five states generally will 
have the same outcome as if the matter had been litigated in a 
state that adopted Alternative C.  Therefore, for purposes of this 
article, these five states are grouped together with Alternative C 
states. 
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH UCC SECTION 2-318  
As currently drafted, section 2-318 creates two fundamental 
problems.  First, section 2-318 produces a lack of uniformity 
among the states that defeats the UCC’s purpose, generates 
unpredictable seller liability, and creates unnecessary disputes 
over applicable law.  Second, section 2-318 removes remedies for 
injured plaintiffs that otherwise are available under the UCC. 
A. Non-Uniformity 
Because of the choice of three alternatives, a lack of 
uniformity exists among the states.  For example, in Allstate 
Insurance v. Toyota Motor Manufacturing North America, Inc., 
discussed above, Allstate was the insurer of a home in Illinois 
that burned down due to a car fire in the garage.55  Allstate sued 
the manufacturer of the car for breach of warranty to recover the 
insurance proceeds that it paid to the insured.56  The court 
dismissed Allstate’s breach of warranty claim:  Illinois is an 
Alternative A state and Allstate was neither a family member of 
the purchaser nor did it suffer any personal injuries.57  In that 
case, Allstate’s sole damage was monetary loss due to the 
property damage caused by the fire.58  Assuming Illinois had 
instead adopted Alternative B, the results would have been the 
same.  However, if Illinois had adopted Alternative C, Allstate  
 
 
 
54 See, e.g., Bishop v. Faroy Sales, 336 So. 2d 1340, 1344–45 (Ala. 1976); 
Hyundai Motor Am., Inc. v. Goodin, 822 N.E.2d 947, 958–59 (Ind. 2005); Groppel Co. 
v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49, 58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Spring Motors Distribs., 
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 663 (N.J. 1985). 
55 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Toyota Motor Mfg. N. Am., Inc., No. 09 C 1517, 2009 WL 
3147315, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2009). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at *2. 
58 Id. at *1–2. 
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could have maintained the suit because an insurance company 
would be a reasonably foreseeable plaintiff and having a personal 
injury would not be a necessary requirement.59 
In the end, the result of a case depends upon the alternative 
that the applicable state chose to enact.  This inconsistency: 
(1) defeats the purpose of the UCC; (2) creates unpredictable 
liability for manufacturers; and (3) generates unnecessary battles 
over applicable state law. 
First, the UCC clearly and conspicuously sets forth its 
purpose and policy, which is “to simplify, clarify, and modernize 
the law governing commercial transactions . . . [and] to make 
uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.”60  The 
underlying objective of this purpose is to facilitate and 
streamline interstate commerce by minimizing uncertainty and 
unpredictability in commercial transactions.61 
Overall, UCC Article 2 has made vast improvements in the 
efficiency and outcome of commercial transactions.  However, 
section 2-318 is an exception to that accomplishment.  Not only 
are the states divided among the three alternatives, but the 
states that have adopted the same alternative often interpret 
that alternative differently.62  Conceivably, every state could 
have a different outcome on the same fact pattern.  The result is 
a section of the UCC that is complex, inconsistent, and hinders 
the ease of interstate commerce.  
Second, the variation in the outcome of the alternatives and 
the discrepancy in the common law interpretation of the 
alternatives prevent a manufacturer from accurately estimating 
its liability for warranty and warranty-related claims.  A 
 
59 See, e.g., Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proksch, 244 N.W.2d 105, 107–08 (Minn. 
1976). 
60 U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(1), (3) (2010); see U.C.C. General Comment of National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law 
Institute (“Uniformity throughout American jurisdictions is one of the main 
objectives of this Code; and that objective cannot be obtained without substantial 
uniformity of construction.”). 
61 See Dom Calabrese et al., Karl Llewellyn’s Letters to Emma Cortsvet Llewellyn 
from the Fall 1941 Meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws, 27 CONN. L. REV. 523, 526–27 (1995) (noting that the UCC helped to 
alleviate the “uncertainty that might have impeded the post-World War II economic 
upswing” at a time when interstate commerce was growing rapidly); see also Gregory 
E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn’s Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 546–47 (2000). 
62 See infra notes 111–18 and accompanying text. 
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manufacturer uses its estimate of warranty liability to determine 
the type and amount of insurance it holds and the amount it 
spends on product safety.63  An inaccurate estimate leads to 
overspending or underspending on insurance and product safety 
measures, which result in economic inefficiency through the 
failure to maximize profits. 
Because a certain amount of uncertainty always exists  
with product liability, manufacturers utilize insurance as a  
risk-management technique to minimize or eliminate that 
uncertainty.64  If a manufacturer cannot accurately estimate its 
liability, it will purchase either too much or too little insurance.65  
Too much insurance results in a waste of resources that could be 
better spent elsewhere, such as research and development or 
product safety.  Too little insurance may not only be illegal66 but 
may also require the manufacturer to dip into cash reserves to 
compensate injured plaintiffs.  If the manufacturer does not have 
enough cash reserves to cover the judgment, the injured plaintiffs 
may go uncompensated and the manufacturer may need to 
declare bankruptcy in order to cope with the liability.67 
Additionally, a manufacturer determines how much money it 
spends on product safety by comparing two costs: (1) the actual 
cost to make the product safer through the design and 
manufacturing processes; and (2) the implicit price of damages 
the product causes to consumers and property.68  To maximize its 
 
63 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 3 (6th ed. 2012). 
64 See id. at 51. 
65 See id. 
66 Most states require a corporation to maintain adequate capitalization, 
meaning that the corporation must have enough assets to cover the liabilities of the 
corporation. Too little insurance is one way a corporation could be inadequately 
capitalized. See, e.g., David H. Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETTE 
L. REV. 371, 374–75 (1981); William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, Shareholder 
Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 837, 868–69 (1982). 
67 See, e.g., John Seewer, Owens Corning Files for Bankruptcy, WASH. POST, Oct. 
5, 2000, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/20001005/aponline124417_ 
000.htm (“Owens Corning filed for bankruptcy protection . . . to help it cope with 
asbestos-related lawsuits that could eventually cost the company $7 billion.”); Tom 
Hals, Asbestos Claims Lead RPM Int’l Units to Bankruptcy, REUTERS, June 1, 2010, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0112012320100601 (“Two subsidiaries of RPM 
International . . . filed for bankruptcy . . . to resolve thousands of asbestos-related 
lawsuits . . . .”). 
68 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 63. 
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profits, which is the ultimate goal of any for-profit corporation,69 
a manufacturer will invest in safety precautions only until the 
cost of additional precautions equals the cost of additional 
accidents.70  In other words, a manufacturer will balance its 
expected gains and expected losses.71  If the estimate of 
additional accidents—which includes the estimate of warranty 
liability—is incorrect, then a manufacturer’s expected loss will be 
incorrect.  Consequently, the manufacturer either will overspend 
or underspend on safety precautions, resulting in the failure to 
maximize profits.   
The third result of the inconsistency among jurisdictions is 
battles over applicable law, which leads to a waste of judicial 
resources.72  Because of the varying outcomes of each alternative, 
it often is beneficial for a litigant to apply certain states’ 
section 2-318 over other states’ provision.  This result 
incentivizes the parties to fight over the applicable law. 
To further complicate this issue, the UCC requires 
“appropriate relations” with the state in order to apply a specific 
state’s law.73  Not only does the UCC fail to define “appropriate 
relations,” it explicitly states that courts should determine the 
meaning.74  Not surprisingly, not all courts define “appropriate 
relations” the same way. 
The most common interpretation—referred to by a variety of 
names such as “center of gravity,” “interest analysis,” and “most 
significant relationship,”—interprets “appropriate relations” to 
require a significant relationship between the state and the 
warranty claim.75  Unfortunately, courts assign varying 
definitions to “significant relationship.”  Some courts determine 
significant relationship to mean where the product was sold, 
 
69 Id. at 12. One of the main assumptions of economics is that corporations act 
rationally. Id. Because “rationality requires maximization,” a rationale corporation, 
therefore, would act to maximize profits. Id. 
70 Id. at 3. 
71 Id. at 250. 
72 For a general discussion on conflict of laws, see generally WILLIAM M. 
RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 
(LexisNexis 3d ed. 2002). For a bibliography of various conflict of laws articles, see 
Symeon C. Symeonides, Conflict of Laws Bibliography: U.S. Sources, 2006–2007, 56 
AM. J. COMP. L. 321 (2008). 
73 U.C.C. § 1-301 cmt. 3 (2010). 
74 Id. § 1-301. 
75 See Compliance Marine, Inc. v. Campbell (In re Merritt Dredging Co.), 839 
F.2d 203, 206–07 (4th Cir. 1988). 
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others determine it to mean where the product was 
manufactured, while still others determine it to be where the 
product caused damage.76  Given today’s complex commercial 
environment and the pervasiveness of internet commerce, 
determining the appropriate state’s law to apply under this 
approach can be difficult in warranty cases because a product can 
be manufactured in one state, sold in a second state, and give 
rise to damage in a third state. 
Consequently, the various outcomes under the alternatives 
of section 2-318 coupled with the ambiguous test provided in the 
UCC encourages disputes over the applicable state law that 
waste time, money, and court resources.77  For example, in Mann 
v. Weyerhaeuser Co., the case turned upon which state’s 
exceptions to privity applied.78  The plaintiffs, comprised of  
eight fruit growers, sued the manufacturer of fruit boxes that 
failed to hold the promised weight.79  The district court, applying 
Nebraska law (Alternative A), dismissed the breach of warranty 
claim for lack of privity, as the plaintiffs did not purchase the 
boxes directly from the manufacturer.80  The plaintiffs appealed, 
claiming that the district court should have applied Iowa law 
(Alternative C), which would have permitted their claim.81  
Although the distributor of the boxes placed the orders in Iowa 
and the plaintiffs used the boxes in Iowa, the distributor and 
manufacturer entered into the contract in Nebraska, the 
manufacturer manufactured the boxes in Nebraska, and the 
manufacturer would pay any judgment from funds from 
Nebraska.82  Using the most significant contacts approach, the 
court held that Nebraska law should apply and therefore 
dismissed the breach of warranty claim for lack of privity.83 
 
 
76 Thornton v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 886 F.2d 85, 90 (4th Cir. 1989). 
77 See, e.g., Uppgren v. Exec. Aviation Servs., Inc., 326 F. Supp. 709 (D. Md. 
1971); Myers v. Council Mfg. Corp., 276 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Ark. 1967); Hardman v. 
Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 198 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964); Hill v. Clark Equip. 
Co., 202 N.W.2d 530 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972). 
78 703 F.2d 272, 274 (8th Cir. 1983). 
79 Id. at 273. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 274. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
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If the alternatives and the common law produced more 
consistent results, plaintiffs and defendants would not need to 
fight over the applicable state law as they did in Mann.  With 
over nineteen million incoming civil cases in state courts  
each year, seventy percent of which relate to contract  
claims, courts struggle to manage their caseloads.84  Eliminating 
this unnecessary debate could save time, money, and other court 
resources, as well as lead to more efficient dispute resolution for 
the parties. 
Ultimately, the inconsistencies created by section 2-318’s 
alternatives and the diverging common law not only defeat the 
purpose of the UCC, but also create economic inefficiency and 
provide an incentive for parties to fight over which state’s law 
applies to the transaction.  The result is a provision that hinders 
interstate commerce by weaving uncertainty, complexity, and 
added expense into commercial transactions. 
B. Lack of Remedy 
In certain circumstances, breach of warranty is the 
appropriate mechanism for recovery of damages rather than 
negligence or strict liability.  However, section 2-318, with its 
limitations on the type of damage recoverable by third parties, 
removes certain remedies under a warranty claim that are 
otherwise available to those parties under the UCC.   
Often, a plaintiff cannot prove that the manufacturer 
breached its duty of care or that the product was unreasonably 
unsafe and therefore cannot recover damages caused by a 
defective product under a negligence or strict liability theory.  
Nevertheless, that plaintiff may still have a valid breach of 
warranty claim.   
 
84 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL – NATIONAL CASELOADS, 
2009, available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2007_files/StateCourt 
CaseloadStatisticsFINAL.pdf. Federal courts are not immune from the problem 
either. On average, parties waited as much as 25.3 months from the date of filing 
until the claim went to trial in federal district courts, and the median wait time in 
2011 was 24.8 months. Federal Court Management Statistics: District Courts—
September 2011, UNITED STATES COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalCourtManage
mentStatistics/2011/District%20FCMS%20Profiles%20September%202011.pdf&page
=1 (last visited Mar. 8, 2012). 
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For example, a plaintiff injured her arm when she rolled  
her Ford SUV in an attempt to avoid a deer in the road.85  She 
sued under theories of strict liability—alleging the SUV was  
not reasonably safe—and breach of implied warranty of 
merchantability—alleging that, due to its high rollover risk, the 
SUV was not fit for its ordinary purpose of driving.86  The jury 
decided that the plaintiff could not maintain a product liability 
claim as the car was not unreasonably unsafe but that Ford 
breached its warranty of merchantability.87 
Ford appealed, arguing that if the SUV was not defective 
under tort law, then Ford could not have breached its warranty 
of merchantability.88  The appellate court upheld the jury’s 
verdict, stating that it is possible for a warranty claim to survive 
even when the tort claim failed.89  First, the court reasoned that 
the two claims are independent of each other.90  Ruling them 
codependent would result in abolishing the warranty of 
merchantability.91  If the legislature had intended to abolish 
warranty of merchantability, it would not have adopted  
UCC § 2-314, which creates the implied warranty that goods are 
“fit for the ordinary purposes for which goods of that description 
are used.”92  Second, the court reasoned that the two claims rest 
upon different meanings of the word “defect.”93  In breach of 
warranty of merchantability, the SUV would be defective if it 
was not fit for its ordinary purpose of driving, whereas in tort, 
the SUV would be defective if it was unreasonably dangerous.94   
 
85 Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 42 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 1994), certifying questions 
to 87 N.Y.2d 248, 662 N.E.2d 730, 639 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1995). 
86 Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 87 N.Y.2d 248, 251–54, 662 N.E.2d 730, 731–33, 639 
N.Y.S.2d 250, 251–53 (N.Y. 1995). 
87 Denny, 42 F.3d at 110. 
88 Denny, 87 N.Y.2d at 254–55, 662 N.E.2d at 733, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 253. 
89 Id. at 254, 662 N.E.2d at 733, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 253. Interestingly, comment 7 
of UCC section 2-314 states that a product that is merchantable under the UCC 
cannot be defective under tort law: “[I]f goods are merchantable under warranty law, 
can they still be defective under tort law, and if goods are not defective under tort 
law, can they be unmerchantable under warranty law? The answer to both questions 
should be no . . . .” U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 7 (2010). 
90 Denny, 87 N.Y.2d at 255–56, 662 N.E.2d at 733–34, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 253–54. 
91 Id. at 254–56, 662 N.E.2d at 733–34, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 253–54. 
92 Id. at 255–56, 662 N.E.2d at 733–34, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 253–54; U.C.C. § 2-
314(2)(c) (2010). 
93 Denny, 87 N.Y.2d at 256–57, 662 N.E.2d at 734–35, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 254–55. 
94 Id. at 258, 662 N.E.2d at 736, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 256. 
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Accordingly, a plaintiff may have a viable breach of warranty 
claim without a valid tort or strict liability claim.  Nevertheless, 
section 2-318—specifically Alternative A—often results in the 
dismissal of that claim when the plaintiff is not the purchaser of 
the product.  In one instance, an employee became pinned 
between a crane and a stone while working in a stone yard 
attaching stones to a crane.95  He sued under both a negligence 
theory—alleging restricted visibility and lack of warning device—
and a breach of warranty theory for his injuries.96  The 
negligence theory failed, as the plaintiff was unable to prove that 
the defendant breached its duty of care.97  The court held that the 
restricted visibility of the crane was not a concealed danger, and 
therefore the manufacturer had no duty to add a safety device.98  
Despite the fact that the defendant did indeed breach its 
warranty, the warranty claim also failed for lack of privity.99  
Because the plaintiff was merely an employee of the purchaser 
and did not purchase the crane, the employee had no privity to 
the defendant.100  In the end, the plaintiff was uncompensated for 
his injuries because all of his claims failed. 
Even assuming the plaintiff could prove all of the elements of 
negligence or strict liability, the economic loss doctrine may act 
as a barrier to a claim for economic losses, leaving a plaintiff with 
breach of warranty as the only viable claim.  The economic loss 
doctrine provides that a plaintiff cannot maintain a products 
liability claim when the only damage is economic loss.101  
Examples of economic loss include: (1) loss of product value; 
(2) incidental damages such as inspection, transportation, and 
storage costs incurred to replace the defective good; and 
 
95 McCollum v. Grove Mfg. Co., 293 S.E.2d 632, 634 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982), aff’d, 
300 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 1983). 
96 Id. at 635–38. 
97 Id. at 635. 
98 Id. at 635–36. 
99 Id. at 638. 
100 Id. 
101 E.g., Vt. Plastics, Inc. v. Brine, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 444, 449 (D. Vt. 1993), aff’d, 
79 F.3d 272 (2d Cir. 1996). For a discussion on whether the economic loss doctrine 
should be abolished altogether, see generally Edward T. O’Donnell et al., On the 
Differences Between Blood and Red Ink: A Second Look at the Policy Arguments for 
the Abrogation of the Economic Loss Rule in Consumer Litigation, 19 NOVA L. REV. 
923 (1995). 
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(3) consequential damages such as lost profits.102  The theory 
behind the economic loss doctrine is that contract law is better 
suited to handle economic loss claims.103 
Section 2-318 as currently drafted, however, fails to embrace 
economic loss claims.  Under Alternatives A and B, a court will 
dismiss a breach of warranty claim by a third party when the 
claim is only for economic loss, even if the end result is that the 
plaintiff is barred from recovering damages.104  For instance, in 
Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., a company sued the 
manufacturer of rock crushing machines purchased through a 
distributor.105  The machines repeatedly broke down over a two-
year period, allegedly causing over $400,000 in lost revenues and 
other damages.106  The court denied the tort claim due to the 
economic loss theory and the warranty claims due to lack of 
privity.107  Despite motions from the plaintiff requesting that the 
court allow the warranty claims to proceed regardless of privity 
so that the plaintiff had some cause of action, the court refused to 
ignore the privity requirement.108 
In the end, the unfortunate result of section 2-318 for 
plaintiffs is that the section often prevents an injured plaintiff 
who possesses a valid breach of warranty claim from recovering 
against a manufacturer when the plaintiff is not the purchaser or 
when the plaintiff claims only economic loss.  
 
102 Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842, 845 (Wis. 1998). 
For a discussion of the differences between economic losses and non-economic losses, 
see Ralph C. Anzivino, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Distinguishing Economic Loss 
from Non-Economic Loss, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1081, 1083 (2008). 
103 See, e.g., Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1, 11 (Utah 2003) 
(“Originating in products liability cases, the economic loss doctrine requires that 
contract law define the remedy when the loss is strictly economic, i.e., when no 
damage occurs to persons or property other than the product in question. . . . ‘The 
authorities recognize that the law of contracts is far better suited to deal with the 
dissatisfaction on the part of a purchaser under such circumstances.’ ”) (quoting 
Cont’l Ins. v. Page Eng’g Co., 783 P.2d 641, 647 (Wyo. 1989)); Daanen, 573 N.W.2d at 
846. 
104 Adirondack Combustion Techs., Inc. v. Unicontrol, Inc., 17 A.D.3d 825, 827, 
793 N.Y.S.2d 576, 579 (3d Dep’t 2005); Daanen, 573 N.W.2d at 847. 
105 Daanen, 573 N.W.2d at 843–44. 
106 Id. at 844. 
107 Id. at 847, 850. 
108 Id. at 850.  
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III. SIGNS OF CHANGE 
Courts are seemingly dissatisfied with the current state of 
section 2-318.  Over the many years since the adoption of 
alternatives in section 2-318, the case law interpreting and 
applying section 2-318 has changed dramatically.  Many courts 
are expanding section 2-318 beyond its plain language and the 
legislative intent in order to achieve fairness and to reflect the 
current public policy attitude toward consumer protection.  These 
courts justify the expansion by relying on a phrase in the 
comments to section 2-318:  “[T]he section in this form is neutral 
and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case 
law . . . .”109  Citing this language, one New York appellate court 
stated that “[t]he Uniform Commercial Code has left the door 
open to courts to extend the protection of warranty to greater 
numbers of plaintiffs.”110 
To illustrate the expansion of section 2-318 by courts, case 
law varies as to whether a purchaser’s employee can sue for 
breach of warranty.  The word “employee” is excluded from the 
language of Alternative A; therefore, many courts bar employees 
in Alternative A jurisdictions from maintaining a breach of 
warranty claim.111  Some courts, nonetheless, have extended 
Alternative A to include employees of purchasers.  The Supreme 
Court of Maine, for instance, interpreted Alternative A to permit 
a purchaser’s employee who was injured by a chipping machine  
 
 
109 U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (2010). 
110 Ciampichini v. Ring Bros., 40 A.D.2d 289, 292, 339 N.Y.S.2d 716, 719–20 (4th 
Dep’t 1973). 
111 See, e.g., Cowens v. Siemens-Elema AB, 837 F.2d 817, 822–23 (8th Cir. 1988); 
Halderman v. Sanderson Forklifts Co., 818 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991); 
Bruns v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 605 N.E.2d 395, 432 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). For a 
detailed discussion of privity in relation to a purchaser’s employees, see Lauren 
Fallick, Note, Are Employees “A” O.K.?: An Analysis of Jurisdictions Extending or 
Denying Warranty Coverage to a Purchaser’s Employees Under Uniform Commercial 
Code Section 2-318, Alternative A, 29 NOVA L. REV. 721 (2005). Interestingly, the 
proposed final draft of the original 1950 Uniform Commercial Code, which contained 
only Alternative A, included language in its official comments specifically stating 
that employees are covered under Alternative A; however, this language never made 
it into the final version. U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (proposed final draft 1950) 
(“[E]mployees of an industrial consumer are covered and the policy of this Article 
intends that neither the privity concept . . . nor any technical constructions of 
‘employment’ shall defeat adequate protection under this section.”). 
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to sue the seller of the machine for breach of warranty.112  The 
court determined that an employee constitutes a family member 
of a corporation and is therefore contemplated by Alternative A:  
Indeed, in the present circumstances, it takes only the 
attribution of a figurative bent to the word ‘family’ to bring 
plaintiff, as an employee of a corporate ‘buyer’, within the policy 
scope of Section 2-318 since plaintiff may be regarded as a 
member of such ‘family’ as a corporation may reasonably be said 
to have.113 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also came to the conclusion 
that employees fall under Alternative A, but under a public 
policy rationale.114  Rather than read “employee” into Alternative 
A, the court held that the employee could maintain a breach of 
warranty claim because it is against public policy to “permit[ ] 
the manufacturer to place a defective article in the stream of 
commerce and then to avoid responsibility for damages caused by 
the defect.”115 
In another example of the judicial expansion of section 2-318, 
some courts in Alternative A states have expanded the plaintiff 
pool even further to include bystanders.  To illustrate, in one case 
a truck pulling a trailer was travelling down a road when the 
hook attaching the trailer to the truck detached, causing the 
trailer to collide with an oncoming car.116  The plaintiff, a  
 
 
112 McNally v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 313 A.2d 913, 921 (Me. 1973). Note that in 
1963, Maine adopted Alternative A of section 2-318. It was not until after this case 
that Maine adopted its own version of section 2-318 rather than choose from one of 
the alternatives. Id. at 921 n.9. 
113 Id. This interpretation of Alternative A demonstrates how dissatisfied some 
courts are with the limitations of the provision—so much so that they must stretch 
the definition of “family member” to include employees. 
114 Salvador v. Atl. Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903, 907–08 (Pa. 1974). 
115 Id. at 907. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania also relied on public policy in 
the lower court decision: “To apply the strict rule of privity against such an employee 
as here, would mean that if the purchaser . . . had been a corporation then there 
would never have been anyone to sue on the breach of warranty for personal injuries 
because a corporation could hardly have a burned arm or a burned leg. . . . The 
doctrine of privity should not be a shield against a breach of warranty action in a 
case like the one here . . . .” Salvador v. I.H. English of Phila., Inc., 307 A.2d 398, 
402–03 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973) (quoting Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 383 S.W.2d 885, 
893 (Ark. 1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d sub nom. Salvador v. Atl. 
Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1974). 
116 Ciampichini v. Ring Bros., 40 A.D.2d 289, 290, 339 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717 (4th 
Dep’t 1973). 
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passenger in that car, brought a breach of warranty claim for 
personal injuries against the seller of the hook.117  The court 
concluded: 
It is both reasonable and just to extend to bystanders the 
protection against a defective manufactured article.  To restrict 
recovery to those who are users is unrealistic in view of the fact 
that bystanders have less opportunity to detect any defect than 
either purchasers or users.  Our decision is one of policy but is 
mandated by both justice and common sense.118 
Courts are even expanding Alternatives A and B to cover 
economic losses in circumstances where no other recovery 
theories are available.  For instance, in a federal court case in 
Connecticut, a company sued the manufacturer and distributor of 
an oil finish product for both property damage and lost profits.119  
After using the finish, an employee for the company followed the 
instructions on the label of the finish, which stated that any rags 
used to apply the finish should be soaked with water and placed 
outside to avoid spontaneous combustion.120  Despite the fact that 
the employee followed the instructions, the plaintiff claimed that 
the rags spontaneously combusted and caused a fire that burned 
down a nearby building.121  The company was precluded from 
bringing a product liability claim under the economic loss 
doctrine, so it sought relief under the UCC.122  Although the 
company had suffered only commercial losses, the court 
permitted the warranty claims because the company’s “only 
recourse [was] warranty under the UCC.  If in fact the plaintiff 
[had] suffered a loss redressable in warranty, it should [have 
been] able to proceed under that theory absent another available 
cause of action, despite the lack of privity with the defendants.”123 
Ultimately, this shift in case law signals that a change is 
needed in the underlying code to achieve fairness and align 
section 2-318 with current public policy. 
 
117 Id. at 290, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 717–18. 
118 Id. at 293, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 720. 
119 Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Denwat Corp., 778 F. Supp. 592, 593 (D. Conn. 1991). 
120 Id. 
121 Id.  
122 Id. at 595. 
123 Id. at 596. 
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IV. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ALTERNATIVES 
In order to mitigate the problems caused by the current 
version of section 2-318 and to align the provision with the 
common law, the drafters of the UCC should make two revisions 
to section 2-318.  First, the drafters should remove certain 
language from comment 3 of section 2-318 to prevent courts from 
relying on this language to expand section 2-318 beyond its 
language and intent.  While the drafters of the UCC intended for 
courts to supplement its provisions, the drafters did not intend 
for courts to supplant its provisions.124  Although courts are 
moving in right direction—toward Alternative C—even this shift 
technically was not within the drafters’ intent.  Courts have been 
expanding section 2-318 beyond the legislative intent by 
justifying their actions with a phrase in comment 3 that reads:  
“[T]he section in this form is neutral and is not intended to 
enlarge or restrict the developing case law . . . .”125  The drafters 
intended comment 3 to discuss section 2-318’s neutrality with 
respect to the ability of a purchaser to sue any party in the 
distribution chain and nothing more.126  When that often-cited 
phrase is read with the rest of the sentence, this intent is 
apparent:  “Beyond this, the section in this form is neutral and  
is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on 
whether the seller’s warranties, given to his buyer who resells, 
extend to other persons in the distributive chain.”127  The 
emphasized language highlights the drafters’ intent to allow 
judicial expansion only with respect to a purchaser making a 
breach of warranty claim within the distribution chain.  
Therefore, courts erroneously use comment 3 to expand  
section 2-318 when the claim involves a party outside of the 
distribution chain.  In order to avoid confusion and prevent the 
unintended expansion of section 2-318, the drafters should revise 
the comment to clarify that section 2-318 only applies to a 
purchaser suing the manufacturer or other seller in the 
distribution chain of the purchased product. 
 
124 U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 2 (2010) (“Therefore, while principles of common law and 
equity may supplement provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, they may not be 
used to supplant its provisions, or the purposes and policies those provisions 
reflect . . . .”). 
125 Id. § 2-318 cmt. 3; see supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text. 
126 See Szajna v. Gen. Motors Corp., 503 N.E.2d 760, 766 (Ill. 1986). 
127 § 2-318 cmt. 3 (emphasis added). 
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Second, while some courts have expanded Alternatives A and 
B to closely resemble Alternative C, a divide among the states 
exists that still needs correcting.  Accordingly, the drafters of 
section 2-318 should adopt only one provision rather than offer 
three alternatives.  The provision should resemble Alternative C 
and extend a product’s warranty to any party reasonably 
expected to use, consume, or be affected by the product for any 
reasonably foreseeable damage without distinguishing between 
personal injury, property damage, or economic loss.  The 
provision should read as follows: 
A seller’s warranty to an immediate buyer, whether express or 
implied, a seller’s remedial promise to an immediate buyer, or a 
seller’s obligation to a remote purchaser under Section 2-313A 
or 2-313B extends to any person or entity that may reasonably 
be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and 
that is injured in person, property, or otherwise by the breach of 
the warranty, remedial promise, or obligation.  A seller may not 
exclude or limit the operation of this section with respect to 
injury to the person of an individual to whom the warranty, 
remedial promise, or obligation extends. 
By adopting a provision reflective of current case law, 
section 2-318 would create more uniformity and predictability, 
minimize disputes over which state’s law should apply to the 
transaction,128 and provide plaintiffs with a channel to bring 
lawsuits even when no personal injury occurred.129  A single 
provision, as opposed to three alternatives, reduces variations 
among the states simply because there is only one provision—
regardless of its content.  Moreover, because the provision would 
permit the recovery of economic losses, it would repair the 
current gap between tort law and contract law. 
V. ALL ABOARD 
A majority of states, if not all, likely would adopt the 
proposed provision as part of their commercial code with little to 
no variation.  The original need for alternatives created by the 
 
128 The author acknowledges that there will always be battles over which state’s 
law to apply to the transaction and that the proposal in this Article only addresses 
conflicts of law caused by the non-uniformity of section 2-318. 
129 W. Equip. Co. v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., 605 P.2d 806, 810 (Wyo. 1980) 
(“We therefore hold that a remote purchaser . . . is not foreclosed from bringing an 
action to recover an economic loss . . . from a manufacturer . . . because of lack of 
privity.”). 
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differing views of liability is waning, as indicated by the current 
case law.  Courts, through their broad interpretation of the 
alternatives in favor of plaintiffs, are signaling that the schism 
among the states from fifty years ago does not exist any longer.130   
Furthermore, the proposed provision provides greater 
protection to consumers, which would be enticing to states in 
today’s consumer-centric commercial society.  Many consumer-
protection laws exist at both the federal and state levels that aim 
to shield consumers from unfair trade practices and unsafe 
products.131  The proposal would similarly protect consumers 
from manufacturers in three particular ways. 
First, the provision would place the risk of loss on the 
manufacturer, as the manufacturer is in a better position than 
the consumer to absorb that risk.  The Model of Precaution, 
developed by Professor Robert Cooter, addresses the correlation 
between compensating injured parties and minimizing social 
costs by analyzing the relationship between “the direct cost of 
harm and the cost of precautions against it.”132  According to the 
Model of Precaution, the law should assign the risk to the party 
who can: (1) bear the risk at a lower cost, or (2) take the best 
precaution to lower the risk.133  In breach of warranty situations, 
the manufacturer can bear the risk at the lowest cost and take 
the best precautions to lower the risk, making it the appropriate 
party to address the risks.  As the producer of the product, the 
manufacturer has a better understanding of the risk profile of 
the product, its potential for defect, and the extent of damage it 
can cause.134  This knowledge allows the manufacturer to more 
efficiently protect itself through insurance and other risk-
management options.  Also, the manufacturer has the lower cost 
of bearing the risk, as it can spread the risk among the cost  
 
130 See supra notes 109–23 and accompanying text. 
131 See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006); Clayton Act, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2006); Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission 
Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–12 (2006); New Vehicle Buyer Proection Act, 
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 380/1–8 (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:18–19 (West 
2011); Consumer Sales Practices Act, OHIO ADMIN. CODE 109:4-3-01 (2011). 
132 Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of 
Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985). While the primary goal of the UCC is to 
make the aggrieved party whole, many of the recent revisions to the UCC also grant 
remedies to injured parties in order to encourage or discourage certain behaviors. 
Maggs, supra note 61, at 582. 
133 Cooter, supra note 132, at 38. 
134 See id. at 41, 43. 
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of its product through cost accounting measures.135  Indeed,  
the manufacturer’s experience and knowledge regarding the 
potential risk of the product and its capability to bear the risk at 
the lowest cost make the manufacturer the most logical party to 
absorb the risk. 
Second, placing the responsibility on the manufacturer 
incentivizes it to produce a higher quality and safer product, 
lessening the chance of a defect136 by encouraging caution, 
testing, and quality control.137  Placing the risk of loss with the 
manufacturer creates “incentives for efficient precaution.”138  In 
other words, if the law places the risk with the manufacturer and 
the precautionary measures are less expensive than paying 
damages, then the manufacturer will take precautionary 
measures to make a better quality product that has a lesser 
chance of defect.139 
Generally, it is more cost efficient to take precautionary 
measures than to compensate for damages, as manufacturing one 
defective product is equal to losing three defect-free products.140  
Moreover, statistics bearing on six sigma141 effectiveness estimate 
that the return on investment is anywhere from two to five 
fold.142  Accordingly, placing the risk of loss on the manufacturer 
should result in the manufacturer taking precautionary 
measures to minimize damage caused by a defective product. 
 
135 Id. at 38. 
136 Richard E. Speidel, Warranty Theory, Economic Loss, and the Privity 
Requirement: Once More into the Void, 67 B.U. L. REV. 9, 13 (1987). 
137 See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 157 & n.6 (Cal. 1965) (Peters, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
138 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 63, at 203 (emphasis omitted). 
139 See id. at 50. Recall that economics assumes that corporations act to 
maximize profits. Id. at 12; see also id. at 4. 
140 Vijay Kumar, Use the 5V Approach To Increase Plant Efficiency, ISIXSIGMA, 
http://www.isixsigma.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=1581:use-the-
5v-approach-to-increase-plant-efficiency&Itemid=156 (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).  
141 Six sigma is a widely-used methodology developed by Motorola to improve 
quality and prevent defects. See T.N. Goh, Six Triumphs and Six Tragedies of Six 
Sigma, 22 Quality Engineering 299, 302 (2010. Six sigma is a five-step process 
whereby a company: (i) defines the problem; (ii) measures the extent of the problem; 
(iii) analyzes the problem to determine the root cause(s); (iv) improves the problem 
by creating solutions to the cause(s); and (v) controls the implementation to ensure 
effectiveness in solving the problem. Jason Mark Anderman, The Future of Contracts 
Seen Through Six Sigma, 25 ASS’N OF CORP. COUNS. DOCKET 40, 42 (2007). 
142  Press Release, iSixSigma, ROI on Six Sigma Programs Directly Related to 
Investment Size, Survey Shows (Nov. 2, 2005), http://www.isixsigma.com/press-
releases/roi-six-sigma-programs-directly-related-investment-size-survey-shows/. 
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Third, the provision allows plaintiffs to recover all 
reasonable damages that they suffer.  A provision that allows 
recovery based upon the type of damage suffered by the plaintiff 
defeats the underlying purpose of remedies under the UCC.  
Remedies under the UCC aim to make the aggrieved party 
whole; in other words, to put the plaintiff in the same position 
that plaintiff would have been if the product had not been 
defective and caused damage.143  The purpose of a remedy should 
not change depending upon the type of damages a plaintiff 
sustains; it should simply compensate a plaintiff with money to 
make the plaintiff as whole as possible.  To allow recovery under 
the UCC but not grant all of the damages typically available to a 
plaintiff under the UCC is an inconsistency that should be 
removed from section 2-318. 
Moreover, distinguishing between personal injury and 
economic loss is arbitrary and unjust.  An economic loss can be 
just as damaging, if not more damaging, than a personal 
injury.144  As the District Court of Minnesota noted, it is simply 
unjust “to allow a plaintiff who sustains personal injuries to 
recover from a remote defendant while not allowing recovery to 
those who suffer only economic loss” as “economic loss can be as 
devastating as injury to one’s person.”145  In one example of this 
injustice, a daughter purchased a Christmas tree that she placed 
in her father’s home.146  At the time of purchase, an employee 
represented that the tree was fire-retardant; however, the tree 
 
143 Maggs, supra note 61, at 578 (noting that the “father of the UCC”, Karl 
Llewellyn, specifically created provisions “that would focus on making the injured 
party whole”); see also U.C.C. § 1-305(a) (2010). For cases discussing this purpose 
with respect to contract law in general, see In re Witte, 841 F.2d 804, 807 (7th Cir. 
1988); First Nat’l State Bank of N.J. v. Commonwealth Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of 
Norristown, 610 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979); Altrutech, Inc. v. Hooper Holmes, Inc., 6 F. 
Supp. 2d 1269, 1273 (D. Kan. 1998); Martin v. Stiers, 165 F. Supp. 163, 167 
(M.D.N.C. 1958) (“The general rule is that a party to a contract, who has been 
injured by the breach, is entitled as compensation therefor to be placed, in so far as 
this can be done by money, in the same position he would have occupied if the 
contract had been performed, and where the breach of contract consists in 
preventing its performance, the party injured, on proper proof, may recover the 
profits he would have realized had the contract not been breached.”) (quoting 
Chesson v. Kieckhefer Container Co., 1 S.E.2d 357, 358–59 (N.C. 1939)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 264 F.2d 795 (4th Cir. 1959). 
144 Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 153–56 (Cal. 1965) (Peters, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
145 Indus. Graphics, Inc. v. Asahi Corp., 485 F. Supp. 793, 804 (D. Minn. 1980). 
146 Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proksch, 244 N.W.2d 105, 106 (Minn. 1976). 
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rapidly caught fire and caused significant damage to her father’s 
house.147  The court permitted the recovery of the economic loss 
despite lack of privity because “[t]he destruction of a home and 
physical damage to personal property is no less an injury to one 
who sustains them than a bodily injury.”148 
Although this proposed revision expands both the plaintiff 
pool and the types of damages recoverable under a breach of 
warranty claim, both the provision and the UCC contain 
limitations that provide safeguards for manufacturers against 
unlimited and unforeseeable liability.  First, the language of the 
proposed provision only permits recovery of a plaintiff’s loss if 
that plaintiff can be reasonably anticipated.149  Thus, the 
proposal creates boundaries to the potential pool of plaintiffs to 
whom the manufacturer would be liable.  Second, as the 
manufacturer is generally the designer and the producer of the 
product, it understands the potential for defect and damage in its 
products.  This manufacturing expertise creates predictability  
of the potential for loss caused by product defect.150  Finally, the 
UCC itself provides mechanisms that allow a manufacturer to 
protect itself from loss.151  Section 2-316 allows sellers not only to 
modify implied warranties, but to exclude them altogether.152  
Even when implied warranties are mandatory under the 
 
147 Id. at 107. 
148 Id. at 110. 
149 E.g., Rynders v. E.I. du Pont, de Nemours & Co., 21 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir. 
1994). 
150 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 63, at 252. 
151 Indus. Graphics, Inc. v. Asahi Corp., 485 F. Supp. 793, 804 (D. Minn.  
1980). The manufacturer is usually the party who ultimately pays in a breach of 
warranty claim. Not only are manufacturers sued under the “deep pockets” theory, 
manufacturers often have indemnification obligations to their distributors and 
retailers. 
152 U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2010). While manufacturers have the option to exclude 
certain warranties, customers may refuse to buy a product without a warranty. In 
the end, manufacturers need to conduct a risk-benefit analysis in choosing whether 
to exclude a warranty to avoid liability. Karl Llewellyn believed that offering a 
warranty is in the best interest of a seller: “[R]epeat orders are what a seller needs; 
to stand behind words, and even behind wares-without-words, is good business for 
the seller . . . .” K. N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 COLUM. L. 
REV. 699, 721 (1936). Indeed, over eighty years after Llewellyn’s article, companies 
still recognize that it is good business to offer warranties. Toyota, for example, is 
looking to add additional warranties to improve its image after the rash of recent 
recalls. Toyota May Increase Incentives, Warranty To Improve Image, MERINEWS 
(Feb. 15, 2010, 1:30), http://www.merinews.com/article/toyota-may-increase-
incentives-warranty-to-improve-image/15798078.html (citizen journal). 
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Magnuson-Moss Act, a federal warranty law, the seller 
nonetheless can limit the duration of those warranties.153  A 
party—whether the purchaser or a third party—can claim breach 
of warranty only to the extent that the warranty is offered by the 
manufacturer and is still valid.154  As stated by one court, “[i]t is 
axiomatic that a remote plaintiff, or any plaintiff for that matter, 
cannot enforce a nonexistent warranty.”155 
CONCLUSION 
The drafters of the UCC should replace the alternatives of 
section 2-318 with one provision that excludes all reasonably 
foreseeable parties from the privity requirement for all 
reasonable damages in order to harmonize the section with both 
jurisprudence and the current trends in consumer protection.  
This revision eliminates the problems with current section 2-318 
by creating more uniformity and predictability, avoiding battles 
over applicable state law, and providing plaintiffs a cause of 
action under which to sue when no personal injury had occurred.  
Furthermore, the replacement of the alternatives with a 
provision similar to Alternative C is appropriate, as it allocates 
risk of loss to the party best able to minimize that risk and 
provides all remedies typically available under the UCC, while 
providing manufacturers and other sellers protection against 
unforeseen and unpredictable liability.  
In the end, if the goal of the UCC truly is “to simplify,  
clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial 
transactions . . . [and] to make uniform the law,”156 then the 
drafters of the UCC should replace section 2-318 with one 
provision in line with the well-developed common law. 
 
 
153 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (2006); id. § 2308(a) (requiring the seller of consumer 
products to provide implied warranties if the seller chooses to provide a written 
warranty). 
154 See Rynders, 21 F.3d at 839 (“They are mistaken, however, in their 
contention that the modification or exclusion of warranties between the buyer and 
the seller has no effect on third-party beneficiaries to the contract.”); Heritage Res., 
Inc. v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 774 N.W.2d 332, 343 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009). 
155 Heritage, 774 N.W.2d at 343. 
156 U.C.C. § 1-103(a). 
